The
Trent Affair of 1861
by
Major W.E. Campbell
In his book, Canada's
Soldiers, Lieutenant-Colonel George F.G. Stanley used the sub-title
"The Military History of an Unmilitary People" to describe the general
lack of interest in military affairs that is characteristic of most
Canadians. However, as he ably described in his book, military operations
and considerations have shaped the very fabric of Canadian society.
Unfortunately, many of these facts have been virtually forgotten
as the role of the military in the development of our country has
been downplayed. One
of these "almost forgotten" episodes is the Trent Affair, which occurred
during the first year of the American Civil War, and almost embroiled
Canada in the American Civil War.
The military response to the Trent Affair was the mounting
and deployment of a force of over 11,500 troops across the winter
storm tossed North Atlantic.
A group of 6,818 of them was then moved 309 miles by sleigh,
in sub-zero temperatures, across New Brunswick to the Saint Lawrence
and then on by rail to Quebec and Montreal. This feat deserves to be remembered and this article will attempt
to do this.
When the American Civil War broke out in 1861, the troop strength
in British North America was at a low ebb.
While it had been increased somewhat from the record low that
occurred when forces were stripped away for duty in the Crimea, it
was still below the traditional level which was parity with the regular
U.S. Army. Using a "good
fences = good neighbours" philosophy, Canada (present-day Ontario
and Quebec) was reinforced by three battalions of infantry and a battery
of field artillery during the summer of 1861.
A long-standing goal of some Northern U.S. politicians was
to add Canada to the Union.
Thus there was a real concern that the Union Forces would move
north after their anticipated quick victory over the Confederate States.
This led to the rapid expansion of the Volunteer movement within
British North America. In September 1861, Canada asked the British
Government to provide 100,000 stands of arms for these Volunteers.
It was not until late October that they agreed to send 25,000
stands but decided not to ship them until the Spring.
Winter was approaching and they could not be made ready in
time to load as the last ship of the season was scheduled to sail
on 5 November. Prophetic words indeed!
This period of cautious tension was abruptly broken on 8 November
1861 when the USS SAN JACINTO boarded the British mail steamer TRENT
in the Bermuda passage and forcibly removed two Confederate Commissioners
who were enroute to Britain and France.
This precipitated the "Trent Affair".
The British Government and people were enraged by this violation
of the laws of the sea and British neutrality. The
situation was further inflamed by the obvious American glee in having
twisted the lion's tail! War
was almost a certainty. While
demands for the release of the Commissioners were made and the dying
Prince Consort, Albert, tried to achieve a peaceful solution to the
crisis, the British War Office made plans for the immediate dispatch
of reinforcements to British North America.
The plan was quickly implemented.
News of the "Trent Affair" did not reach London until
28 November, the decision to reinforce Canada was made on 6 December
and the first troops had sailed by 7 December.
The campaign plan was highly flexible.
If required, an invasion of the U.S. would be conducted using
the two traditional routes, which were south from the Niagara Peninsula
and from Montreal via Lake Champlain.
These forces, operating in conjunction with the Royal Navy
which would blockade the Atlantic ports, would split the Northern
States in half. These
efforts, combined with those of the Confederate States, would have
likely resulted in a speedy victory.
Otherwise, the plan was to defend the border against possible
Northern aggression. The
local militia forces would have been used to augment the British regulars
as needed.
The first group of forces to deploy was designed to bolster
the defences of British North America pending the arrival of a larger
force in the Spring, prior to the start of the campaigning season,
and to guard against an early Spring offensive by the North.
The troops destined for Nova Scotia Command (present day New
Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island) could come directly
by sea. However, the
majority of the force was to go to Canada and this presented the greatest
problem. The shipping
season in the Saint Lawrence had closed in late November as had the
lighthouses and other aides to navigation.
It was hoped that ships could get as far up the Saint Lawrence
River as Rivière du Loup, which was the Eastern Terminus of the Grand
Trunk Railway, or Bic which is about 54 miles below Rivière du Loup.
If this was not possible, the ships were to divert to Halifax.
The troops would then proceed to Saint John and, from there,
go overland to Rivière du Loup where they would take the train to
Quebec City, Montreal and points as far west as London, CW.
Although it was a quickly planned deployment, it was not poorly
planned! The War Office
had learned the lessons from the Crimean War and the disastrous winter
of 1854/55. Officers
with experience in Canada were extensively consulted, as was Florence
Nightingale who gave valuable advice on the health and sanitation
of the troops during a winter march.
A retired Commissariat officer, who had made the arrangements
for the march of the 43rd, 85th and 34th Regiments during the winter
of 1837/38, made many suggestions that were incorporated into the
final plan.
Hectic preparations took place in the United Kingdom as troops
were warned for duty, ships were chartered and supplies of warlike
stores such as weapons, ammunition, camp stores and uniforms for both
the British troops and the militia of British North America were readied
for shipment. The winter
voyage across the storm tossed North Atlantic was fraught with danger.
Troop ships and their escorts were separated by the bad weather.
Most of the ships chartered were side-paddle steamers which
limited their ability to navigate the ice which they would encounter
in the approaches to the Saint Lawrence River and their engines were
prone to storm damage. The
newspapers of the day reported the PARANA, with a thousand troops
on board, overdue and feared lost but fortunately this was not true.
Besides having a slow passage, she had run aground on a sandbank
during a snow squall, subsequently floated free on the next tide and
eventually reached Halifax. Only one ship, the PERSIA, actually made it up the Saint Lawrence
as far as Bic. As the
men of the 1st Battalion of the 16th Regiment were being disembarking,
a rush of ice came down river and she quickly had to put to sea.
A company of infantry was left on board and a portion of the
crew was left on shore! The
soldiers helped to man the ship until she could reach Halifax.
The ship carrying the bulk of the 96th Regiment
had to put back to England after two attempts due to damage. The Regiment was commended by the Admiralty for its efforts
in helping to save the ship!
A total of sixteen ships were chartered, some of which made
more than one voyage.
By the end of December 1861, the harbour of Halifax was filling
up with troop ships. The
next problem was the onwards movement of those troops which were destined
for Canada. At Halifax,
the military staff under the Commander, Major General Sir Hastings
Doyle, had been working on this.
The normal winter route to Canada was by the railway from Maine
to Montreal. Given the
pending war, this was not an acceptable option.
While the basic plan was that the troops would be conveyed
to Saint John, there were two options for their onward movement.
The first choice was the tried and true one up the Saint John
River to present day Edmundston and then overland to Rivière du Loup.
An alternate route, which used the rail link from Saint John
to Shediac and then went by road to Campbellton and overland to Métis
on the Saint Lawrence, was investigated but discarded. So,
while the troops were crossing the Atlantic, the military staff was
busy arranging for transportation, lodgings and food along the Saint
John River route.
The desire to use modern methods of transportation was quite
evident. A portion of
the Saint Andrews and Quebec Railway had been built from Saint Andrews
to Canterbury and it was initially thought that this would be the
best way to move the troops as far as Woodstock.
However, this did not work out as the railway proved to be
unequal to the task due to the cold weather and the quantity of snow
on the tracks. The route,
as finally used, ran overland from Saint John to Fredericton, then
along the West Bank to Grand Falls where it crossed over the suspension
bridge to the East Bank, and onwards to Little Falls (Edmundston)
before going North to Fort Ingall and then over the "Grand Portage"
to Rivière du Loup. Baring
weather delays, it took ten days to complete the journey by sleigh.
Nine overnight stops were arranged and these were manned by
detachments of the Military Train, Army Hospital Corps and the Commissariat
Staff Corps. Food was purchased locally although the Commissary set up bakeries
at Grand Falls and Fort Ingall.
An advanced headquarters was established at Saint John to control
the movement of the troops.
The 1st Bn Military Train was charged with the management of
the transportation. The
contract for this had been arranged by Assistant Commissary General
Mahon at Fredericton and was awarded to three contractors who divided
the route into three stages (Saint John to Fredericton, Fredericton
to Little Falls and Little Falls to Rivière du Loup).
These contractors provided roughly constructed two-horsed sleighs,
which were capable of holding eight men facing each other.
The
Guards, being larger men, could only put six in each one.
Each
sleigh was provided with a small repair kit consisting of a saw, hammer,
nails, clasp knife and cord for repairs or emergencies on the road
plus an allocation of snow shovels and snowshoes.
Many of the drivers and horses were normally employed in the
lumber trade, or were local farmers, and so were familiar with the
winter conditions that would be encountered. Similar sleighs were provided for the carriage of the eighteen
Armstrong guns of the three Field Batteries.
The troops were divided into packets of approximately 160 men
for movement. A typical packet consisted of a sleigh with half of
the officers, baggage sleighs with an escort, sleighs with the main
body of troops and the last sleigh with the remaining half of the
officers. Prior to departing England, each soldier was provided with
cold weather clothing consisting of: furcaps with ear lappets, woollen
comforters, chamois waistcoats, a flannel shirt and drawers, warm
gloves, a pair of long boots and thick woollen stockings. The men
of the Military Train were also issued a pea jacket. In addition to
this, the men were issued moccasins at Saint John and the contractors
provided straw and buffalo robes for use in the sleighs. For further
warmth, the men were provided with hot meals at breakfast, midday
and supper. They were also encouraged to run alongside the sleighs
in shifts to maintain circulation. Medical officers travelled with
most groups and others were located at each of the halts.
The route had improved considerably since the previous deployments
over it. It now followed
an established road. The
part through New Brunswick was not good as it was in poor repair whilst
the portion in Canada was well kept.
Snow ploughs and rollers were used to keep it open during the
bad weather. Where
possible the troops were billeted in existing buildings such as houses,
hotels, warehouses or barns. They were fortunate to be able to use
the barracks in Saint John and Fredericton and the abandoned post
at Fort Ingall was refurbished.
It was only at Petersville and St. Francis that temporary long,
low log buildings called "cabanos" had to be build for shelter. The officers stayed in nearby hotels or private homes.
During the march of the 104th Regiment in the winter of 1813,
a company had been storm delayed in the area between Fort Ingall and
Rivière du Loup, and so reserve stores of food were made to guard
against this possibility. All
told, the force had a much easier trip than the 104th had in 1813
when they had to march on foot pulling toboggans!
The following table shows the details of the route and the
overnight stopping places that were set up: | |||
|
ROUTE OF THE OVERLAND MARCH | |||
|
Day |
Distance |
Location |
Remarks |
|
0 |
0 ( 0) |
Saint
John |
Controlling
Headquarters. Major General Rumley commanding. |
|
1 |
30 ( 30) |
Petersville |
|
|
2 |
30 ( 60) |
Fredericton |
|
|
3 |
29 ( 89) |
Dumfries |
|
|
4 |
32 (121) |
Woodstock |
|
|
5 |
23 (144) |
Florenceville |
|
|
6 |
26 (170) |
Tobique
(Andover) |
|
|
7 |
24 (194) |
Grand
Falls |
|
|
8 |
36 (230) |
Little
Falls (Edmundston) |
|
|
|
Mid-day
stop |
Degele
(Degèlis) |
|
|
9 |
37 (267) |
Fort
Ingall (Cabano) |
Rations
for 200 men for 30 days stocked here. |
|
|
Mid-day
stop |
St.
Francis |
Rations
for 200 men for 5 days stocked here |
|
10 |
42 (309) |
Rivière
du Loup |
Transfer
to Grand Trunk Railway. |
By mid-January, the Saint Andrews option had been abandoned
and the troops were leaving directly from Saint John.
The command and control of the move was quite simple.
Although the route crossed the border between the Nova Scotia
and Canada Commands, it was decided that the overland portion of the
move from Saint John to Rivière du Loup would be commanded by Nova
Scotia Command from a headquarters located in Saint John vice Halifax.
Canada Command would then be responsible for the entraining
and onward movement to Quebec, Montreal and more Westerly locations. The movement
of the troops was regulated by the use of the telegraph.
This necessitated the speedy establishment of telegraph offices
at any of the nightly stops that did not already have one.
The officers in charge of the groups of troops would report
in every evening. Based on this information, their travel could be controlled
and delayed if preceding groups were held up by storms as did occasionally
happen. Further control
was exercised by staff officers who constantly moved up and down the
route in express sleighs. By
13 March 1862, the last group of troops had cleared Rivière du Loup.
In all, 274 Officers and 6544 NCOs, Rank and File passed along
the route. This included
the guns and equipment of the three field batteries of artillery,
which would obtain their horses once in Canada.
The two battalions of the Military Train would also acquire
their horses and waggons in Canada. There
was also an unrecorded quantity of military stores. Curiously, the
rate at which the force was moved along the route was not dictated
by availability of sleighs but by the ability of the GTR to provide
railcars at Rivière du Loup. The cost of transporting the troops was
found to be no more expensive than the cost of an equivalent move
using the British rail system.
It is recorded that the troops were received with great warmth and kindness
all along their route, which greatly eased their passage.
The following is a list of the regiments and other units that
made the overland march to Canada during the winter of 1861/62:
Infantry
1st Battalion Grenadier Guards
2nd Battalion Scots Fusilier Guards
one company 1st Battalion 16th (Bedfordshire) Regiment
62nd (Wiltshire) Regiment
63rd (West Suffolk) Regiment
1st Battalion The Rifle Brigade
Artillery
E, F, and G Batteries 4th Brigade Field Artillery
Numbers 5 and 6 Batteries 7th Brigade Garrison Artillery
Numbers 1, 4, 5 and 6 Batteries 10th Brigade Garrison Artillery
Engineers
Number 15 and 18 Companies Royal Engineers
Support Corps and Others
56 Cavalry Instructors for Cavalry and Volunteers
1st and 3rd Battalions Military Train
Detachments of Medical Officers and men of the Army Hospital
Corps
Detachments
of Commissariat Officers and men of the Commissariat Staff Corps
When planning the move, there were three main considerations:
enemy, weather and desertion. Fortunately, there was no enemy threat
as the Trent Crisis had subsided by the end of December and the North
had decided to release the Confederate Commissioners. However, it
was decided to continue with the deployment of the tasked troops but
additional forces that had been warned were stood down. The North
graciously offered to allow the force to use the Portland, Maine to
Montreal railway link. The British Authorities prudently declined
this offer. However the Staff, who had sailed on a "lame duck"
ship which took 29 days to reach Halifax vice the normal 12 or 13,
did not reach Halifax until 5 January 1862. As they had to quickly
reach Canada, they prudently covered up their military baggage labels
and took the next Cunard Mail Steamer to Boston and then the U.S.
railway to Montreal.
Because of the excellent medical arrangements, there were few
casualties during the move. Not more than 70 men were admitted to
the hospitals en route. Only two died as the result of disease and
another two died due to excess drinking. Of the eleven cases of frostbite,
only one was serious and that was because it was combined with excessive
drinking. Although temperatures of as low as -25 degrees Fahrenheit
were recorded, it was considered to be a mild winter as there was
little wind. While there were some delays due to weather, the only
serious one was caused by a blizzard on 21/23 January. Desertion was
also minimal. The "crimps" were very active along the Maine
- New Brunswick border. There was a great demand for trained soldiers
in the Union Army. British soldiers were offered tempting bounties
and promotion if they would desert and enlist in the Union army. The
town of Tobique (present day Andover) was a particular hot bed for
this. The Lieutenant Governor of New Brunswick called out the militia
to help guard against the "crimps" as well to assist with
the movement of the troops. The officers travelling in each of the
packets were specially charged to be on their guard. All told, there
were only nine desertions, three of these being at Tobique.
Once in Canada, the employment of the troops was non-eventful.
Although the threat of invasion by the North had dissipated,
a defensive posture was maintained. There was a reduction in the force level in Canada during the
summer of 1862. By the
Fall of 1862, the force had been divided into three manoeuvre groups.
The group based in London, Ontario could counter any intrusions
along the Detroit/Windsor border and reinforce operations along the
Niagara border. Similarly,
the one based in Toronto could support the Niagara frontier or move
East to Kingston or even Montreal.
The third group, which made up the bulk of the force including
a Brigade of Guards, was in Montreal and could block any moves up
the historic Richeleau River invasion route in addition to moving
either West or East along the Saint Lawrence River.
Each of these manoeuvre groups consisted of a battalion or
more of infantry, a battery or two of field artillery, perhaps a company
of engineers and, for mobility, at least a troop of the Military Train.
For operations, they would have been reinforced by militia
infantry, artillery and cavalry as required.
There was another manoeuvre group based in New Brunswick, which
could counter any initial attacks across the Maine border.
Had difficulties occurred here, this group could have been
swiftly reinforced from Halifax and have been supported by the Royal
Navy.
In addition to mounting guards and training themselves, the
regular army garrisons were also used to train the units of the growing
Canadian Volunteer Militia.
Regular officers instructed at the Military Schools that had
been established in 1864. Beginning
in 1865, the British Regulars ran Militia Camps of Instruction were
held in various locations such as La Prairie and Fredericton.
When not on duty, a popular activity amongst the officers was
to visit the Union and Confederate armies in the field.
One of the first to do this was Colonel Clark-Kennedy, the
Colonel-Commandant of the Military Train, when he visited the Union
Army of the Potomac in February 1862.
After his visit to the Army of Northern Virginia, Lieutenant
Colonel Wolseley thought that a division of regular troops acting
in consort with either side would turn the tide of the war.
At that time, a British division consisted of between ten and
twelve regiments of infantry, which was fairly close to the force
that the British had in Canada.
The effort expended in training the Volunteer Militia was greatly
repaid in the following years when they were called out to patrol
the border when relations with the North were again strained by Confederate
Agents using Canada as a base for raids against the North and when
the Fenians threatened Canada in 1866 and 1870.
Many of the British units that had deployed in response to
the "Trent Affair" were still in Canada and provided valuable
service during both the Fenian Raids and the Red River Expedition
of 1870. Defence was
one of the major unifying factors that brought the British Colonies
in North America into Confederation in 1867.
The British Forces, by their presence and by their training
of the militia, made a significant contribution to the defence of
both Canada and the Maritime Provinces as they responded to the threats
posed by the American Civil War, the Fenians and the rebellion in
the Red River District.
In retrospect, it is not surprising that the Trent Affair is
an almost forgotten event. No blood was spilled during it and, once
in British North America, the troops had a fairly easy go of it. One
of the greatest hazards that the young officers faced was avoiding
the charms of the Belles of Montreal. However, their winter deployment
across the Atlantic and the sleigh ride through New Brunswick is another
matter. I am not aware of a similar feat in British military history.
Hopefully, this article has shed a bit of light on the otherwise bland
remarks in regimental histories or soldier's papers to the effect
that they served in Canada or Nova Scotia - 1862.
References:
The
Predecessors of the Royal Army Service Corps
by Lt Col C.H. Massè MC
A
Victorian Soldier and his Times
by Lt Col A.E. Clark-Kennedy
Report
on Army Health for 1862
(Canada portion) as kindly provided by Capt (Retd) P.H. Starling,
R.A.M.C. Historical Museum
The
Story of a Soldiers Life
by Field Marshall Viscount Wolseley
Our
Garrisons in the West
by Lt Francis Duncan RA
Illustrated
London News.
Various editions 1861 and 1862
Facey-Crowther,
David. The New Brunswick Militia, 1787 - 1867. Fredericton:
New Ireland Press, 1990.
Senior,
Elinor Kyte. Roots of the Canadian Army: Montreal District 1846
- 1870. Montreal: Society of the Montreal Military & Maritime
Museum, 1981.
Stanley,
George F.G. Canada's Soldiers - The Military History of an Unmilitary
People. Toronto: MacMillan Company, 1960.
©
Copyright WE Campbell 1999 All Rights Reserved
7th
Bde G.A.